An analysis of Operation Bagration, the 1944 Russian offensive in Belorussia, highlighting key tactical errors and its connection to Operation Overlord.

Operation Bagration analyses the great Russian offensive in Belorussia in the summer of 1944 covering the planning of the operation as well as the German plans of the summer campaign of 1944. In depth research sets out to determine the real ratio of the Soviet and German forces as well as their actual losses during the operation.

As well as some good decisions, command on both sides made some crucial mistakes as well as main tactical errors all of which are studied in this book to produce a fully rounded view of the campaign and highlights a connection to Operation Overlord by proving that it was only due to the landing at Normandy that the Soviet forces were able to destroy the German Army Group Centre while the elite mobile forces were concentrated in France.

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Foreword
• Chapter 1 Why Was the Western Front Command Removed in April 1944?
• Chapter 2 The Poles’ye Tragedy
• Chapter 3 The Belorussian Partisan Movement through the Eyes of a Cadre Chekist
• Chapter 4 The Prelude to ‘Bagration’
• Chapter 5 The Rout
• Chapter 6 The Voyage of the ‘Wiking’
• Chapter 7 The Voyage of the ‘Pseudo Wiking’
• Chapter 8 The Salvation of Army Group Centre
• Chapter 9 The Sides’ Losses
• Notes