Although the Guards armored Division and its sister formation the 6th Guards (Tank) Brigade shared a common origin, they went on to forge quite different operational records. One of the units would be tarnished by its failures while the other was applauded for its successes. A month after VE Day, the two Guards’ armored formations would be reunited one last time before being officially disbanded. During the intervening years, the Guards faced criticism, public ridicule, the threat of disbandment, and many other challenges. Nevertheless, these armored Guardsmen would prevail on the battlefield.

In response to the threat of a German invasion of the British Isles, the Guards armored Division formed in the spring of 1941. But why convert battalions of Foot Guards, considered by many to be first-class infantry, into an armored formation? Certainly, many people were sceptical that 'spit-and-polish' Guardsmen could ever adapt to a new armored role.

As the threat of invasion receded, the Guards armored Division and 6th Guards (Tank) Brigade embarked on years of training while the war raged elsewhere. This book examines the decision to form the Guards armored Division and then keep it at home for an extended period. Once deployed to Normandy, the fighting quickly revealed shortcomings in the Division's training, equipment, and operational procedures. In contrast, when the Churchill tanks of the 6th Guards (Tank) Brigade went into action south of Caumont it was to prove an affirmation of everything they had learnt in training. Over the next ten months, the Guards’ armored formations would celebrate victories and lament failures while fighting their way across northwest Europe.

This book examines how the decision to raise a Guards armored Division came about, and why the idea met with such strong opposition. It also takes an in-depth look at the training, equipment, and culture of the Brigade of Guards, and how that influenced the two formations’ preparedness for war. Once deployed overseas, the book explores how the Guards were able to adapt to changing conditions on the battlefield and adopt new operational and tactical procedures.

Finally, the book reveals why the Guards’ armored formations were hurriedly disbanded in June 1945. Additionally, using new archive material, the book discloses why it took over a decade to publish the ‘official’ history of the Guards armored Division.

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
  • Operation GOODWOOD
  • Operation BLUECOAT
  • Operation MARKET GARDEN
  • Operation VERITABLE
  • Primary Sources
• Section One: Formation and Training
  • Chapter 1 Armoured Doctrine and the Inter-War Years
    • Plan 1919
    • The Evolution of the Armoured Division
  • Chapter 2 Formation of the Guards Armoured Division
  • Chapter 3 Resistance to Putting Guardsmen into Tanks
    • Was the Conversion to Armour Detrimental to the Infantry?
  • Chapter 4 Early Organisation and Training
    • Battle School, Battle Drill
    • The Imber Incident
    • Battle Drill and Training Deficiencies
    • Lessons Learned and Forgotten
    • Training Ground and Equipment Deficiencies
    • Exercises in Futility?
  • Chapter 5 6th Guards (Armoured/Tank) Brigade
    • Trial by Fire
  • Chapter 6 Allan Adair’s Fitness to Command
  • Chapter 7 The Guards Ethos
    • Guardsmen Basic Training
    • Recruitment, Selection and Social Elitism
    • The Guards Manpower Crisis
  • Chapter 8 Tanks: Covenanter to the Sherman
    • The M4 Sherman
    • New Equipment, Same Tactics
    • The Churchill Infantry Tank
• Section Two: Into Battle and Lessons Learned
  • Chapter 9 Operation GOODWOOD
    • Normandy
    • OVERLORD
    • Prelude to GOODWOOD
    • The Operational Challenges of GOODWOOD
    • The Guards at GOODWOOD
    • Assessment and Legacy of GOODWOOD
    • GOODWOOD Lessons Learned
  • Chapter 10 Learning to Fight in the Bocage
    • A Summary of Lessons Learned
    • A Failure of Application
  • Chapter 11 Operation BLUECOAT
    • Battle of Caumont
    • Lessons Learned by the 6th Guards
    • Post-BLUECOAT Criticism
  • Chapter 12 Tank Casualties and Loss of Confidence
    • Sherman Pros and Cons
    • Survivability
    • The Perception and Reality Gap
    • The Churchill Tank: Overcoming Obstacles
  • Chapter 13 The Liberation of Brussels
    • Operation MARKET GARDEN
    • A Brief Historiography
    • MARKET GARDEN Lessons Learned
    • Operational Character
    • The Failure to Relieve Arnhem
    • Confidence or Conceit?
  • Chapter 14 Operation AINTREE
    • A Guardsman’s Testimony
    • A Cuckoo in the Nest
  • Chapter 15 Operation VERITABLE
    • The 6th Guards and the Rhineland Battles
    • Operation BLOCKBUSTER
    • Lessons Learned from VERITABLE
    • An Infantry Battle for an Armoured Division
    • The Application of Lessons Learned in Training
  • Chapter 16 The Division as Learning Organisation
    • Mad Night Dash
    • Artillery, Rockets and Tanks
    • Action at Ems Bridge
  • Chapter 17 6th Guards (Armoured) Brigade: From the Rhine to Münster
    • The Grenadier Guards and British Airborne
    • The Final Push
    • The End of the Guards Armoured Experiment
  • Conclusions
    • Political Effectiveness
    • Strategic Effectiveness
    • Operational Effectiveness
    • Tactical Effectiveness
    • Final Assessment
  • Postscript
    • They Were Not Divided
    • The Book Dispute
    • Rosse and Verney
    • Rosse and Hill
    • A Bridge Too Far
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Plates