Allied Convoys to Northern Russia, 1941–1945  
Politics, Strategy and Tactics
Author(s): William Smith
Published by Pen and Sword
Publication Date:  Available in all formats
ISBN: 9781399054751
Pages: 0

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ISBN: 9781399054751 Price: INR 1695.99
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A carefully researched work providing an overview of the strategic factors dominating the costly yet war-winning Arctic convoy program.

While the experiences of the men and ships who sailed in the Allied convoys to North Russia between August 1941 and May 1945 have been fully documented, the wider political, diplomatic and military factors which determined the campaign are less well known.

The principal actors Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin each had their own agendas and expectations, influenced by advisers and competing national priorities. These inevitably gave rise to differences putting pressure in turn on the convoy program while the varying effectiveness of German counter-action was a significant and unpredictable factor.

1942 was dominated by pressure on Churchill from Roosevelt and Stalin to increase the size of convoys at a time when the Royal Navy lacked the necessary escorts. This deficiency was exacerbated by heavy merchant shipping losses and the demands of Operation TORCH.

The temporary convoy suspension in 1943 followed the deployment of German heavy warships to Norway and the diversion of escorts to Operation HUSKY. A serious Anglo-Soviet rift, which led to Allied threats to discontinue the program, was only resolved by lengthy negotiations. It resumed until temporarily suspended due to the D-Day landings after which the increasing escort availability allowed operations to run uninterrupted until May 1945.

This carefully researched work providing an overview of the strategic factors dominating the costly yet war-winning Arctic convoy program will be welcomed by experts and laymen alike.
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A carefully researched work providing an overview of the strategic factors dominating the costly yet war-winning Arctic convoy program.

While the experiences of the men and ships who sailed in the Allied convoys to North Russia between August 1941 and May 1945 have been fully documented, the wider political, diplomatic and military factors which determined the campaign are less well known.

The principal actors Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin each had their own agendas and expectations, influenced by advisers and competing national priorities. These inevitably gave rise to differences putting pressure in turn on the convoy program while the varying effectiveness of German counter-action was a significant and unpredictable factor.

1942 was dominated by pressure on Churchill from Roosevelt and Stalin to increase the size of convoys at a time when the Royal Navy lacked the necessary escorts. This deficiency was exacerbated by heavy merchant shipping losses and the demands of Operation TORCH.

The temporary convoy suspension in 1943 followed the deployment of German heavy warships to Norway and the diversion of escorts to Operation HUSKY. A serious Anglo-Soviet rift, which led to Allied threats to discontinue the program, was only resolved by lengthy negotiations. It resumed until temporarily suspended due to the D-Day landings after which the increasing escort availability allowed operations to run uninterrupted until May 1945.

This carefully researched work providing an overview of the strategic factors dominating the costly yet war-winning Arctic convoy program will be welcomed by experts and laymen alike.
Table of contents
  • Cover
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Contents
  • Chapter 1 Aid for Russia: June 1941 to February 1942
  • Chapter 2 The German Military Response
  • Chapter 3 The May 1942 Shipping Debate
  • Chapter 4 Convoy PQ 17
  • Chapter 5 Future Convoys’ Competing Operational Priorities
  • Chapter 6 September 1942 Convoy Suspension PQ 19 Independent Sailings
  • Chapter 7 Treatment of British Service Personnel in North Russia
  • Chapter 8 November 1942: Resumption of Convoys
  • Chapter 9 Operation GRENADINE and Anglo-Russian Diplomatic Relations
  • Chapter 10 March 1943 Convoy Suspension
  • Chapter 11 Continuing British Service Personnel Problems in North Russia
  • Chapter 12 Russian Pressure for Resumption of Convoys
  • Chapter 13 Negotiation on Renewal of the Convoy Programme
  • Chapter 14 Churchill’s Preconditions for Resumption
  • Chapter 15 Resumption of Convoy Cycle: November 1943 to April 1944
  • Chapter 16 Suspension of Convoys Before OVERLORD
  • Chapter 17 The Final Convoy Cycle
  • Chapter 18 Retrospection and Reflection
  • Appendix
  • Analysis and Conclusions
  • Convoy Sailing Programme
  • Notes
  • Bibliography
  • Plates
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